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IX. Remedies for Deception
A. Damages
B. Tracing-Constructive Trust
C. Rescission Plus Punitive Damages
X. Rescission-Discharge for Value as a Defense to Restitution from a Broker
XI. Remedies for Mistake
XII. Remedies for Breach of Land Sale Contract
A. Buyer in Default-Damages-General Principles
B. Damages v. Rescission v. Foreclosure of Vendor's
Lien v. Suit to Quiet Title
1. In General
2. Foreclosure of Vendor's Lien
3. Rescission
4. Suit for Damages
5. Do Nothing
6. Suit to Quiet Title
C. Contract for the Sale of an Interest in Land-Seller
in Default-Specific Performance v. Damages
XIII. Remedies for Breach of Contract
A. Construction Contracts-Breach by Owner-Damages
B. Employment Contracts-Breach by EmployeeSpecific Performance and Damages
XIV. Contracts Nonnally Unenforceable by Reason of the
Statute of Frauds or the Statute of Wills
XV. Illegal Contracts-Equitable Remedies

I. Introduction
Remedial problems are best dealt with in the context of
substantive law situations. However, the disparate characteristics of restitution, equitable remedies, and damages necessitate some generalized preliminary comment. We regret that
the points raised in the California cases during a one-year
52
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period do not form a tidy or cohesive pattern or adapt themselves to a symmetrical outline.

II. Restitution-Some General Principles
To obtain restitution under the common law, an action of
assumpsit was utilized where the relief sought was a money
judgment for benefits received by the defendant. Customarily,
the claim is characterized as "quasi-contractual"; it is well
established that section 537 (1) of the California Code of
Civil Procedure supports an attachment in conjunction with
such a claim as an "action upon a contract, express or implied,
for the direct payment of money." The principal reason for
choosing quasi-contract in preference to an alternative tort
claim, in the fairly well defined situation where it is allowed,
is to take advantage of the attachment provisions. The logic
of this position is apparent when consideration is given the
case of Samuels v. Superior Court. 1 The petitioner (defendant
in the main action) unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus
to quash an attachment as to certain moneys held by him.
The factual situation is obscure, the dispute apparently
arising from dealings between the parties relative to an apartment house, the plaintiff asserting a right thereto but the defendant being in position to collect the rentals from the tenants. The questioned attachment concerned the garnishment
of certain of these rents (in the somewhat miniscule amount of
$25 or $30) in conjunction with a complaint labeled, "Quiet
Title to Real Property; Specific Performance of Contract;
Damages for Breach of Contract; Rescission of Deed; Cancellation of Deed; Fraud; Abuse of Process; Declaration of Constructive Trust", followed by some 11 causes of action, the last
being for money had and received as to the rental. The appellate Court described this as "hodge-podge" and "messy" and
earnestly suggested that no attempt be made to go to trial
without cleaning things up at a pretrial conference. The immediate point before the court, however, was the validity of the
1. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 81 Cal. Rptr.
216 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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attachment. Petitioner offered two arguments. The first
was that an attachment is not authorized in an "equitable
action not based on contract or quasi-contract." The Court
had little difficulty in rejecting this contention. Equitable
claims, even when commingled with assertions of tort, do not
preclude a proper concomitant assertion of a quasi-contractual
remedy allowing attachment. The claim as to rents was
clearly one based on an "implied-in-law" contract within the
terms of Code of Civil Procedure section 537 (1); the Court
characterized it as one falling within those instances where
a defendant, in possession of funds collected by him from
a third person, is under a legal duty to account to plaintiff.
While this commonly, as here, gives rise to an assumpsit count,
it could also be justified as an example of an even more ancient
common-law restitutionary action, that of "account." Or,
if one wishes to stretch a bit, it may be recalled that mesne
profits are recoverable in California by means of a common
count separate from the tort action of ejectment or trespass.
The petitioner's second objection to the garnishment of
the rents has an odd sort of surface logic. He asserted, correctly, that a plaintiff cannot attach his own property. Thus,
since plaintiffs claimed as the real owners in equity of the
property, the rents were likewise claimed and could not be
garnished. The appellate Court was sufficiently intrigued by
this to request supplemental briefings, but neither counsel shed
any light on the point by way of analysis or authority. Nor
could the appellate Court find controlling authority in this context. It solved the problem by invoking the general principle
(citing authorities) that if the defendant's right to the fund
garnished is such that he, as principal debtor, could have sued
the garnishee in debt or assumpsit, then the garnishment of
the fund is proper. Although this explanation seems to beg
the question, the holding must be accepted as correct. The
notion that a plaintiff cannot attach his own property has validity in terms of tangible property, but not money claims; otherwise a defendant in an action for money had and received
could quash any attachment by claiming that the fund attached
was indeed the very money "received." At the same time it
must be admitted that the holding results in another anomaly,
54
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i.e., that in an action for money had and received for rents
to which the plaintiff rather than defendant is entitled, the
plaintiff may garnish the tenants and thus attach the rents
before the defendant "receives" them. While justifiable in the
abstract (and useful on occasion) the principle here established was of such trifling relevance to the overall case, involving primary ownership rights in extensive real estate,
that insistence upon it here seems inappropriate. The overall
dispute was plainly one of equitable jurisdiction, and the
quasi-contract count is of vestigial significance. In such circumstances the appellate Court was quite correct in pointing
out that a more appropriate ancillary remedy would be the
appointment of a receiver of the rents pendente lite. The Court
noted with asperity the "fruitless labor of counsel and unnecessary consumption of judicial time, at both the trial and
appellate levels" which could have been avoided had plaintiff originally used the ancillary equitable receivership.
The decision in Peterson Tractor Co. v. Orlando's SnackMobile Corp.2 deserves a decided "caveat" in terms of restitutionary principles. The individual defendants were officers,
directors, and dominant shareholders in a pair of corporations, Litecrete Construction and Orlando's Snack-Mobile.
To bolster Litecrete's credit rating, the defendants gave to
Dun & Bradstreet, on behalf of Orlando's Snack-Mobile and
themselves as individuals, a statement of continuing guaranty
for Litecrete's obligations. The statement further authorized
Dun & Bradstreet to rely on the guaranty in furnishing a credit
rating. The plaintiff, before doing business with Litecrete,
obtained a credit report from Dun & Bradstreet which disclosed the relationships between the· defendant and Litecrete,
but did not mention the guaranty. In reliance upon the report, the plaintiff extended credit to Litecrete. Litecrete became defunct. Defendants, when sued in their capacity as
guarantor, pointed out that since plaintiff did not know of
the guaranty and had not been given written notice of acceptance, no basis for a contract action existed. Defendants
2. 270 Cal. App.2d 787,76 Cal. Rptr.
221 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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also suggested that the statute of frauds applied. The defendants were quite correct in this position, but the trial and appellate Court (as well as the writer) inclined toward the plaintiff. Given the perimeters of the facts stated, the remedy
would apparently lie in a routine application of the doctrine
of "disregard of the corporate entity." In a situation of guaranty, the related theory of "alter ego" would readily dispose
of the statute of frauds problem. The appellate Court, however, justified a finding in plaintiff's favor by citing, of all
things, section 90 of the First Restatement of Contracts, 3
regarding promissory estoppel (not that there was either a
"promisee" or "reliance," but because there was unjust enrichment) ; hence, a quasi-contractual remedy was imposed by
law. The implication that causes of action arising under
section 90 are quasi-contractual, deriving from unjust enrichment (or vice versa), is so aberrational to either the law of
contracts or the doctrine of restitution that it might be best to
ignore the opinion in Peterson Tractor, without quarreling
with the outcome.

III. Damages-General Comment on Punitive Damages
Some minor facets of punitive damage awards were polished
by two California cases in the past year. The fact that tortfeasors are labeled "joint" does not mean that all will be
liable for punitive damages assessed against one: so held
the Court in Oakes v. McCarthy CO.,4 a land slippage case
in which compensatory damages were assessed against the
tract developer (for negligence) and the vendor (for fraud)
as joint tortfeasors. Punitive damages, however, were entered
against only the vendor. The same case repeated the familiar
holding that the wealth of the tortfeasor is a factor in calculating exemplary damages in California.
3. § 90
Promise Reasonably Inducing Definite and Substantial Action.
A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
56
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In Carter v. Agricultural Insurance CO.,5 it was held that
the surety on the attachment undertaking required by section
539 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not liable for punitive
damages imposed upon the attachor for wrongful attachment.
The decision rests upon statutory construction, though an inference may be drawn from dicta that the Court was inclined
(at least slightly) toward the line of cases holding that sureties and liability insurers are not liable for punitive damages.

IV. Equitable RemediesA. Enforcement of Decrees-Contempt
The utility of the injunctive remedy must depend, in the
long run, upon the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism
of contempt unless the citizenry is conditioned to respond reflexively to judicial exhortation-a situation which seems increasingly less likely. In simple form, the mandatory injunction is enforced by coercive imprisonment until performance
is obtained. The more common negative or prohibitory decree poses quite different problems. If the order involves the
prohibition of a single irreversible act (the usual picturesque
example of ringing a bell), any contempt proceeding is perforce purely punitive in nature. If the prohibitive decree is
directed against continuing conduct where repeated violations
are possible, a contempt citation, while punitive as to past conduct, retains a measure of coercive, in terrorem overtones as to
future violations. Finally, a decree prohibiting a single correctable act also has a dual aspect insofar as contempt process
for violation is concerned; it is punitive in that fine or imprisonment may be imposed for the violation,6 and coercive to the
extent that a mandatory order may be issued (in replacement
of the negative decree) to take corrective measures, which
order is in turn enforceable by purely coercive confinement.
5. 266 Cal. App.2d 805, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 462 (1968).
6. Outside of California it is common practice to award compensatory
CAL LAW 1970
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In California, an attempt has been made to include all this
and more in a single statutory procedure governing contempt
citations. The most relevant sections are 1218 and 1219 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The latter covers the coercive
power to compel compliance with mandatory equity decrees
by confinement, provided the contemnor has the present ability to comply. The former, section 1218, provides for limited
fine or imprisonment and covers all other contempt situations.
Although, as noted, fines or imprisonment may have an indirect coercive effect in deterring further violations, section
1218 remains basically punitive. Whatever the original civil
characteristics of the equitable contempt doctrines incorporated in these enactments, the California statutes have been
repeatedly characterized as "quasi-criminal" in nature. The
result of this characterization is that a vigorously literal compliance is frequently exacted in this state, and technicalities
(perhaps overtechnicalities) hinder fast and effective enforcement of what, after all, are purely civil remedies. For example, in California, a plaintiff who has been pecuniarily damaged by the defendant's violation of an injunction must bring a
separate action for such damages, because no provision for
such is made in the statutory contempt sections. 7
The decision in Liu, In res displays a typically rigorous adherence to the letter of the statutory contempt plan of California. As a result of a separate maintenance action, child
custody was awarded to the wife. On April 22, 1968, an
order was issued restraining the husband from removing the
child from Los Angeles without first obtaining a prior order
of court or written consent of the wife. On November 7,
1968, the husband removed the child from Los Angeles County. In December the wife filed a declaration and an order
to show cause was issued; in early 1969, the husband was
adjudged in contempt and ordered to be confined until he
complied. In the cited decision the husband was released on
a writ of habeas corpus. The defects found in the procedures
7. H. J. Heinz Co. v. Superior
Court, 42 Ca1.2d 164, 266 P.2d 5
(1954).
58
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followed by the lower court have a bearing on the practical
effectiveness of civil contempt in California.
First, the appellate Court noted that, unfortunately, the
trial judge had elected not to punish the husband for past
offenses (section 1218) but to imprison him to compel future
compliance (section 1219). The declaration did not specifically state that he had the present ability to comply (the trial
court expressly said he did, however), and hence he was not
adequately apprised that at the hearing he might be sentenced
indefinitely.
Second, the declaration did not allege a violation of the
order of April 22, 1968, because it did not aver that the removal of the child was without either a prior court order or
the wife's written consent. Bearing in mind the implicitness
of the lack of the order or consent, and that we are dealing
with the welfare of children in a purely civil case, the rigid
technicality of the California approach to civil contempt becomes markedly apparent.
Third, although the contempt order itself stated that the
husband had the present ability to comply, the appellate Court
held to the contrary. The order was to not remove the child.
The child was removed on the seventh of November. Said
the Court: "There is no way in which the petitioner can now
not remove the child on November seventh . . . . A bell
cannot be unrung although a court orders it to be done."
According to the appellate Court, the trial judge should have
issued a new mandatory order for the child to be returned,
and then repeated the whole section 1219 contempt routine.
By way of comment (avoiding as much as possible the fog
which always surrounds the use of double negatives), the
Court's bell-ringing analogy is inapt. The child can be returned. The point is whether essential matters can be summarily disposed of in the contempt proceedings without being
unfair to the contemnor. The Liu case says it can't be done
and the controlling case (Dewey v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.
64,22 P. 333 (1889)) says it can't be done. In Dewey, the
defendant was enjoined from maintaining a dam or other
obstruction to the flow of a creek. The defendant obstructed
CAL LAW 1970
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the creek. In contempt proceedings the defendant was ordered confined until the obstructions were removed. The
Supreme Court reversed the contempt order, holding that
a second mandatory order to remove the dam would have to
be made.
The Dewey case, besides suggesting questions as to the
mandatory order disguised in negative form, more directly
raises practical issues. If a contemnor wilfully does an act
in violation of a negative equity decree, which act can readily
be undone, why should the plaintiff have to go back to the
beginning and obtain a second mandatory order to get what
he had in the first place? Why should there be a "quasicriminal" mystique about enforcing negative equity decrees
in civil cases? Is it the lesson that trial courts should
word decrees in the mandatory form wherever possible to
expedite enforceability? The concurring opinion in Liu demurred on this point:
I do not think it is necessary to hold that where a party
has violated a prohibitory injunction and the contempt
power is used coercively under section 1219 . . . to
compel him to undo what he has done, it is essential
that the court have first made a mandatory order to that
effect . . . I rather suspect that [Dewey] is a product
of an age in which mandatory injunctions were ill favored. It seems to me that if a court enjoins a defendant not to dig a ditch and he does dig a ditch, justice
does not require a second order that he fill up the ditch,
before the court can order him to do so on pain of
imprisonment until he does, provided, of course, he has
the present ability.9
Interestingly enough, the same appellate Court a few weeks
later, in reviewing a contempt order for violation of a negative decree, did indeed separate the punitive (quasi-criminal)
elements from the civil enforcement element, and approved a
corrective measure embodied in the contempt order itself.lO
9. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr.
85 (1969).
60
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The opinion is but one of many in lengthy and vigorously
contested litigation, the case having reached the appellate
level several times. The facts must be drastically abridged.
In 1962 land was sold by Alpine Palm Springs Sales, Inc. to
Green Trees, Inc. on promissory notes secured by trust deeds.
When Green Trees failed to make payment, Alpine began
foreclosure. Before sale was had, Green Trees sued for fraud
and in 1964 had judgment for compensatory damages (which
took the form of halving the amount due on the notes), punitive damages, and an injunction against foreclosing on the
trust deeds for a certain period to allow Green Trees to make
arrangements to payoff the balance. This negative decree
(on which focus must be kept) was repeatedly extended and
expired finally on November 4, 1966. On September 28, 1966
the court of appeals reversed the judgment below. Alpine
waited 30 days and on October 31, 1966, four days before
the injunction expired, held a foreclosure sale, purchased the
property, and received foreclosure deeds. Green Trees, however, appealed to the Supreme Court which, in 1967, reversed
the court of appeal and affirmed the 1964 judgment in favor
of Green Trees along with the extensions of the injunction
against foreclosure. The effect of this action was to put Alpine
in violation of the injunction and exposed to contempt proceedings, which Green Trees, with evident relish, pushed.
The trial court found the Alpine group in wilful contempt
and ordered it to revest the title acquired by foreclosure in
Green Trees. In the event the order was not carried out
within 30 days, the clerk of the court was empowered to act
in Alpine's stead. This is the order reviewed on petition
for writ of certiorari and prohibition by the court of appeal
in the present case. Alpine raised numerous objections to
the order, of which two need be noted here:
a) that the adjudication of contempt was barred by the
statute of limitations since the contumacious act
had taken place two years before;
b) that the order to retransfer title to the property obtained through the foreclosure proceedings in violation of the negative decree was beyond the jurisdicCALLAW1970
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tion of the court because it was not a form of punishment prescribed in either section 1218 or 1219.
In reviewing the order and objections, the appellate Court
looked to both the punitive and "curative" aspects of the proceedings in deciding whether the statute of limitations had
run. l l Although the trial judge chose to impose no punishment for violating the order, the appellate Court still found it
essential to rule on the limitation issue, since conceivably the
judge had in mind the imposition of punishment if the Alpine
group failed to convey, so as to require a conveyance. On
this issue the court said:
We hold the statute has run against the punishment
phase of the proceeding. We do not feel however that
any statute of limitations has run against the judicial step
of curing the continuously operating effect of the contemptuous act. 12
As to the second point, whether the order embodied measures not authorized under sections 1218 or 1219, the Court
said:
We conclude that where a court has issued a
prohibitory injunction and it has been violated and the
effect of the violation can be cured by a further direction
to the contemnor to perform that curative act, such an
order can validly be made
. this [remedy] can
properly be applied to a real property title situation. 13
By way of final comment on this decision, it is submitted
that a welcome step has been taken in separating the purely
punitive aspects of the California statutory contempt scheme
from the aspects concerned with effectuating civil equity decrees. However, the curative measures taken here to rectify
the result of the violation of the negative decree can be accomplished without the ultimate threat of imprisonment under
11. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
415,425.
12. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
415,424.
62
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section 1219. If the curative measures necessary were such
as required in Liu-i.e., the entry of a new mandatory order
enforceable only by threat of imprisonment-the question
still remains as to whether the "quasi-criminal" gloss which
has been given to proceedings under that section would compel the application of the one-year statute of limitations not
only as to the actual confinement for contempt but even to
the entry of the substitute mandatory "corrective" order itself.
B. Legal EfJect of Equitable Decrees

The question of whether an equity decree has direct effect
on legal title was raised in the Alpine opinion. The Alpine
group acquired legal title through deeds issued as the result
of foreclosure proceedings, which Alpine was, at the time,
enjoined from instituting. The Supreme Court held the sale
invalid. Does this automatically revest title in Green Trees?
If so, contempt proceedings would be unnecessary, and if
Green Trees desired further adjudication it would take the
form of a quiet title suit. Without denying this possibility,
[W]e are not convinced that this
the court stated, ".
is a practical solution and would have the clarity and strength
in the chain of title as would a retransfer deed executed by
Alpine Estates or by the clerk acting for the superior court. "14
This expression is in conformity with the traditional equity
approach that its decrees normally operated only in personam. 15

C. Comments on the "Clean Hands" Maxim
The California courts properly continue to avoid a reflexive
application of the "clean hands" doctrine in equity causes,
14. 66 CaJ.2d 782, 59 Cal. Rptr. 141,
427 P.2d 805 (1967).
15. In the 1967 edition of this publication the remark was made: "A
rather unusual combination of remedies for deceit was sanctioned by the
Supreme Court in Green Trees Enterprises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine
Estates." York, REMEDIES, Cal LawCAL. L.AW 1970
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where litigants who are with personal fault abound. Two
cases within the past year involve attempts to recover property transferred by the plaintiff with intent to place it beyond
the reach of creditors. In Samuelson v. Ingraham 16 the maxim
was invoked to bar a constructive trust, claimed with regard
to realty transferred on oral trust, with the admitted intent
to defraud creditors. That no creditors were complaining
was held immaterial, since intent was the gravamen rather
than accomplishment. A different result was obtained in
H ill v. Younkin. 17 Here the plaintiff (Hill) conveyed title
to separately owned property worth $89,000 to his daughter
because he was "scared of lawsuits." The potential lawsuit
arose from an automobile accident that was settled for $600,
partially on the belief that Hill had no assets or insurance.
In making the transfer, Hill was advised by counsel of the
danger that his daughter might refuse to reconvey, but he
insisted on the conveyance. He should have listened to counsel. The daughter did refuse to reconvey, although Hill lived
on the property and paid taxes until his daughter's death. The
daughter had named her mother (the divorced wife of Hill)
as sole legatee and devisee and the plaintiff brought a quiet
title action. The Court concluded that the trial judge was
correct under the circumstances in refusing to apply the
"clean hands" doctrine, noting that while "intent" is a prime
factor, the equity court must nevertheless consider all the facts.
The disparity between the value of the property and the settled
claim was duly noted; moreover, the claimant was found not
to have been actually defrauded, considering the moderate
nature of the injuries, the availability of counsel, and even the
suggestion of contributory negligence. Furthermore, the
claimant made no later attempt to rescind the settlement.
Had the grantee (daughter) not flatly refused to reconvey
prior to her death, the decision of the trial judge in plaintiff's
favor would have been much easier. The appellate Court,
in affirming, sanctioned a liberal exercise of discretion on the
part of the trial judge in applying or refusing to apply the
16. 272 Cal. App.2d - , 77 Cal.
Rptr. 750 (1969).
64
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maxim. The degree of discretion allowed suggests that "clean
hands" may be used two ways-as predominately a "defense,"
or as predominantly a measure to protect the court itself from
affront. Which emphasis will be favored in California in any
given case is not predictable. For example, one line of cases
tends to conceptualize the clean hands doctrine as a "defense"
in the sense that it must be raised in the trial court to be
available; these holdings are referred to in Behm v. Fireside
Thrift Co. lS The notion of "unclean hands" as a "defense"
reached its culmination in the case of Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists/ 9 and leads
promptly to the error (as it did in Fibreboard) of suggesting
that the doctrine is applicable to law actions, presumably in
derivation from the idea that equitable "defenses" are available in law actions. This confuses the inequitable with the
illegal. On the other side, the Behm case also notes a partially offsetting line of cases in which the doctrine has been
applied sua sponte by a trial court where the defendant's conduct has been "flagrantly unconscionable." In addition to
holding that the questioned conduct in Behm was not "flagrantly unconscienable," the Court gave what is perhaps a
more sound reason for declining to apply the doctrine in this
particular litigation, stating that the plaintiff was seeking to
bar the defendant from asserting a legal defense of mutual
mistake.
In Delfino v. Delfino,20 the Court distinguished "unclean
hands" from "unclean testimony" and declined to apply the
doctrine against a wife seeking to set aside a decree of annulment. Her supporting affidavits disclosed that she had committed adultery, but the Court went on to note that the other
man had been secretly paid by the husband. To prevent the
proof of unpleasant facts created by the inequitable conduct
of the other party is not the function of the doctrine.
18.
Rptr.
19.
Rptr.

272 Cal. App.2d 15, 76 Cal.
849 (1969).
227 Cal. App.2d 675, 39 Cal.
64 (1964).
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V. Remedies for Protection of Real Property Interests
Plaintiff turned to equitable remedies to obtain a declaration of an easement of right-of-way over a portion of defendant's land in Miller v. Johnston. 1 The difficulties between
these neighboring parties arose over plaintiff's restricted
means of access in difficult terrain. Over the course of several
years, plaintiff's problem in getting home became even more
complicated by reason of the loss of certain rights and privileges vis-a-vis the defendant. At the time of suit, access was
nearly impossible unless plaintiff could use a small triangular
area of defendant's property for turning purposes. The
technique here used to afford equitable relief is of interest
inasmuch as the result was placed solely and squarely on the
relative hardship doctrine, the application of which was
facilitated by defendant's request for a counter-injunction
against plaintiff's continued trespasses. The Court's analogy
was to encroachment cases in California, reasoning that the
transitory passage of vehicles over another's land is different
only in degree from a driveway which "encroaches" upon the
land twenty-four hours a day. In thus creating an equitable
easement by necessity as it were, the court required plaintiff
to pay the maintenance expenses of the strip. A further
judgment for $200 in damages in favor of defendant was indicated. The Court, naturally, denied that its action amounted
to unconstitutional private condemnation.
VI. Remedies for Protection of Literary Property
William v. Weisser2 represents an excellent discussion (particularly so to any academician) establishing a common-law
copyright of a professor in his lectures. Defendant hired individuals to attend university classes and take lecture notes,
which were then published under defendant's copyright. The
remedies were an injunction, compensatory damages of
$1,000, and punitive damages of $500. An accounting for
1. 270 Cal. App.2d 289, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 699 (1969).
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defendant's profits would seem possible under the circumstances, but apparently was not pursued.

VII. Malicious Prosecution-Consequential Damages
An unusual case of malicious prosecution led to an unusual
award of special damages in MacDonald v. Joslyn. 3 The
malicious "prosecution" was a pre-probate will contest, and
the "victim" was the executor of the will of Marcellus L.
Joslyn. In the course of the will contest, the plaintiff, who
had supervised the estate plan, had been charged, unjustly
it was found, with undue influence, fraud, and conspiracy
and "gratuitously" subjected to a demand for punitive damages. The publicity in the newspapers from these charges
allegedly affected the plaintiff both socially and in his business relationships. His bank called a loan for $100,000; he
lost business positions; his health suffered. General damages of $10,000 for injury to reputation and for mental anguish were found by the trial court.
Special damages of $123,052.91 were also found. As the
result of the pre-probate contest, the public administrator was
designated as special administrator of the Joslyn estate. He
received ordinary and extraordinary commissions that the
plaintiff would have otherwise received. Plaintiff also lost
fees as testamentary trustee of certain trusts under the will,
interim trustees having been appointed.
In addition, $50,000 punitive damages (as to which the
wealth of the defendant was considered) were found. The
appellate Court affirmed all elements of damage, to the penny.

VIII. Remedies for Personal Injuries-Damages.
Excessive Awards and the Collateral Source Doctrine
Excessive damage awards in personal injury cases continue
to raise the problem of whether the solution is to be by retrial on the damage issue, usually conditioned on non accept3. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr.
707 (1969). For further discussion of
CAL LAW 1970
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ance of a remittitur, or by retrial on all issues because the size
of the award suggests passion and prejudice infecting even
the findings of basic liability. Gordon v. Strawther Enterprises, Inc. 4 is an example of the former; Collins v. Lucky
Markets, Inc. 5 of the latter.
A curious twist has been given to the remittitur question
in a Supreme Court decision, Sabella v. Southern Pacific CO.,6
because of trial tactics which have been employed to counter
the application of the collateral source doctrine in personal
injury cases. The doctrine operates, in the usual case, to exclude evidence of reimbursement of the defendant through
insurance, pensions, or other forms of disability compensation.
The defendant frequently proffers evidence, particularly of
disability pensions being drawn by the plaintiff, as relevant
to an issue of plaintiff's motivation to indulge in malingering.
The possible impact of this evidence on the jury's ultimate
calculation of damages need not be pursued here. In any
event, the decisions in California this past year deem the admissibility of such evidence to be within the proper discretion of the trial judge (section 352 of the Evidence Code),
the probative value being balanced against the potential prejudicial effect. In Sabella, a case arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the trial judge excluded evidence of
plaintiff's application for a disability pension, but thought
better of it after the verdict. 7 The solution adopted was to
effect a remittitur, reducing the damages from $115,000 to
$80,000, which plaintiff accepted. The railroad, which in
this instance appears as a beneficiary of the holding, objected
that remittitur is an improper device to remedy the error of
exclusion of relevant evidence and argued that "having de4. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr.
417 (1969).
5. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
454 (1969).
6. 70 Ca1.2d 311, 74 Cal. Rptr. 534,
449 P.2d 750 (1969).
7. The reason for the judge's change
of mind is understandable. In addition to the usual "probative" ground
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regarding plaintiff's motives, there were
two other bases for admissibility: (1)
the plaintiff himself had introduced as
evidence one part of his application
for a disability pension, and (2) plaintiffs' counsel had in strong terms
claimed the defendant had turned its
back on the plaintiff, which assertion
would be rebutted by the admission of
the entire application.
CAL LAW 1970

18

York: Remedies

Remedies

prived defendant of a full hearing by the jury on all evidence,"
a new trial is necessary. The Supreme Court rejected this as
"untenable" because the evidence was relevant to the damage
issue alone-a conclusion consistent with legal concept, although not, perhaps, with the folklore of certain trial lawyers.

IX. Remedies for Deception
A. Damages
The basic out-of-pocket measure of damages for fraud in
connection with the sale of property required by the Civil
Codes has been considered unduly restrictive.
Therefore it was said in Hartong v. Partake, Inc., "the courts have
tended toward a liberal computation of 'additional damages'
. . . which include the reasonable value of time fruitlessly
expended by a plaintiff in reliance on the representation of
a defendant."g In Hartong, various plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to acquire franchise distributorships. In the
end they were saddled with the necessity of getting rid of merchandise stocks by covering the routes and making additional
sales. Compensation for the time spent in such attempts (actually pursuant to the duty to minimize) was affirmed by the
appellate court. A point of minor interest here is that the four
successful plaintiffs, all without experience in the particular
franchise business, came from different backgrounds and had
different skills. Thus their "additional damages" (although
all plaintiffs did the same thing in consequence of the fraud)
varied in accordance with their previously established hourly
earning capacity. Hartong, a college student earning $3 per
hour as a savings and loan officer, therefore sustained less
"additional damage" than Botemiller, a driver for Union Oil,
at $3.40 per hour.
B. Trmacing-Constructive Trust

If money obtained by fraud is used to acquire title to property or is applied to improvements thereon (subject, of course,
8. C.C. § 3343.
CAL LAW 1970
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to the evidentiary requirements of tracing), the equitable
remedies of a constructive trust on, or lien against, the property may be had. These remedies are commonly invoked
when the money is traced to property otherwise exempt from
levy and execution on ordinary money judgments. The case
of Schoenfeld v. Norberg 10 indicates that the principle will
not be overextended. Schoenfeld defrauded Norberg of over
$13,000 in 1956; of this amount, $274.42 was traced to homestead property and was repaid to Norberg before judgment,
ultimately entered in an amount exceeding $19,000. In 1965
Norberg caused a writ of execution to be issued and levied
on the homestead. Norberg's position was that if any illgotten moneys are traced to a homestead, the property
loses its exempt character and becomes subject to any judgment. The court disagreed and affirmed an injunction against
the sale of the property by the sheriff. It reasoned that, because the small sum traced was repaid before judgment, the
homestead stood as one obtained and declared in a lawful
manner, in which no tainted money appears. On the facts,
this appears to be an equitable result, but the decision raises
a troublesome question of whether, for instance, an embezzler
can protect exempt property by making partial restitution and
electing to apply it to the satisfaction of that portion of the
misappropriated money which has been traced, rather than
to that which has not.
C. Rescission Plus Punitive Damages

Two cases ll in California in 1968-69 confirm the trend
toward a firm rule that an election to disaffirm a contract and
seek restitution on grounds of fraud does not preclude a claim
for punitive damages. The 1967 edition of this publication
noted some previous uncertainty on the point. 12
10. 267 Cal. App.2d 496, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 924 (1968).
11. Mahon v. Berg, 267 Cal. App.
2d 588, 73 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968).
Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors,
270 Cal. App.2d 477, 75 Cal. Rptr.
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871 (1969). F or further discussion of
the latter case, see Moreau, TORTS, in
this volume.
12. York, REMEDIES, Cal La\\,Trends and Developments 1967, p. 283
at pp. 300-301.
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Rescission-Discharge for Value as a Defense to Restitution from a Broker

Attorneys for the purchasers of realty should be alerted
to a provision that may appear in escrow instructions relating
to broker's commissions. In Holmes v. Steele/ 3 a contract
to purchase a tavern business was entered into, an escrow was
opened and cash deposits made. Although not requested by
either the buyer or the seller, the following appeared in the
escrow instructions:
It is expressly agreed and understood that the seller is
presently obligated to pay to Jack Steele & Associates a
brokerage commission of the sum of $2,000.00 for services rendered and completed. Seller and buyer authorize and instruct said broker to retain and apply from
buyer's deposit of $3,000.00 the sum of $2,000.00 as
payment in full of seller's obligation. Seller shall credit
buyer on account of the purchase price for said payment
on his behalf.14
The sum of $2,000.00 was paid to Steele outside of escrow,
and thereafter the buyer rescinded the transaction because
of misrepresentations made by the seller that constituted
a breach of warranty. The action was against the broker,
Steele, for restitution of the $2,000.00. The majority of the
Court held that the defense of discharge for value would be
available depending on the further determination of certain
facts by the trial court. (A concurring and dissenting opinion
favored the broker on agency rather than restitutionary principles.) The Court quoted a Comment from section 17 of the
Restatement of Restitution,
. if the creditor beneficiary has an existing right
against the third person and receives the property in
discharge of the duty of the third person, the rule stated
in § 14 is applicable. As there stated, he is protected
against rescission of the transaction unless, at the time
of receiving the property, he had notice of a defect in
13. 269 Cal. App.2d 675, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 216 (1969).
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the original contract which would permit rescission as
against the promisee.
Thus, unless the broker is shown to have knowledge of the
breach of warranty as would allow rescission against the
seller, the buyer here, as a result of the escrow provision, is
left with a presumably unsatisfactory remedy against the
seller in tort or restitution.
XI. Remedies for Mistake

Where a mistake has occurred in a bargaining transaction,
usually the mistake is raised as an affirmative defense to an
action for specific performance, or the mistake is used as a
basis for rescission and restitution. An exposition of some of
the California law in this area is contained in Lawrence v.
Shutt,15 where specific performance was sought by plaintiff,
and defendant counter-claimed for rescission. The Court
avoided the rescission of a land sale, but decreed an equitable
adjustment of the rights of the parties. The ultimate result
seems both fair and reasonable, although the rationale may
not satisfy purists.
The case arose out of the sale of 1280 acres of land to
developers, the balance of the purchase price being secured
by deeds of trust. There is no question as to the adequacy of
consideration at the time of the making of the contract. The
dispute centers about the "release" clause in the escrow instructions and deed of trust. As is not uncommon in this
type of land development, the land is released from the deed
of trust in parcels as payments are made. As development
proceeds, the resultant income enables the developers to obtain the release of other parcels. Here the topography of
the land in question varied, some being well suited for development, the remainder being rough and uneven. To avoid
piecemeal selection by the developers, the clause provided for
the release, upon specified payments, of lands in parcels "next
contiguous" to those already freed. The sellers' understand15. 269 Cal. App.2d 749, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 533 (1969).
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ing was that following the release of an initial 80-acre tract,
rectangular parcels of 40 acres would be released, "each proceeding from one boundary of the property parallel to adjacent
boundaries towards the center." The developers' interpretation, upon which they were acting, was stated in open court:
"the word 'contiguous'.
. gave them [the developers]
the unrestricted 'right to select for release a piece of property
that merely touches' and hence they could take that portion
of the property suitable for development and leave the [sellers]
with hills and gullies.,,16 Under this interpretation the sellers
could well visualize an ultimate denouement of a development
winding through the prime areas of the whole tract, with a
substantial portion of the unpaid purchase price secured only
by worthless land. It is important to note that the sellers began expressing dissatisfaction with the release clause before
the close of escrow, and, through counsel, intimated that it
was unenforceable. They did not, however, object to the
closing of the escrow, and sometime after the close, when it
became apparent what ta~k would be taken by the developers,
they did serve a notice of rescission for mistake (and other
grounds later abandoned). In the meantime, the sellers
physically interfered with the developers to the point that one
of the sellers was jailed for contempt in violating an injunctive decree.
When the case reached the litigation stage, it had this
posture: the developers were seeking specific performance
(particularly of the release clause), declaratory relief, and
to quiet title; the sellers counterclaimed for rescission. The
trial court decreed rescission. On appeal, the first issue
considered, however, was the existence of a defense to specific
performance of the release clause. The conclusion was that
the clause was unenforceable because of uncertainty and unreasonableness, with the qualification that there was no requirement that the entire contract be invalidated. This alone
would necessitate reversal.
At this point, it might appear that everything had been
16. 269 Cal. App.2d 749, 762, 75
Cal. Rptr. 533, 540.
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decided that needed to be decided, since the developers could
have accepted the equitable qualification, inconvenient as it
might have been to the future financing of their project, or
else acquiesce in the proffered rescission. (Actually, the developers proved content with the declaration of unenforceability of the clause.) However, the Court, for some unspoken
reason, proceeded to deal with the counterclaim for rescission
in detail. The somewhat puzzling aspect is that the same
release clause held unenforceable for uncertainty was next
reexamined in terms of "mistake." As has been said, any
further analysis seemed unnecessary, but if there is a compulsion to do so within the "mistake" concept, it at least could
be short; there was simply no ground for rescission since
there was no mistake as to any fact constituting the basis of
the bargain. At most there was a misunderstanding as to
the meaning of words embodied in a nonintegral part of the
contract, which had already been remedied by excision on
terms favorable to the sellers and acceptable to the buyers.
Misunderstandings raise problems as to contract creation,
but not as to rescission. There was never any suggestion that
there was not a contract here, in either a subjective or objective sense. In all fairness, there is a passage in the opinion
to the effect that contractual obligations will not be set aside
merely because of unilateral misunderstandings, but the main
thrust of the opinion is clear. It runs as follows: sellers were
unilaterally mistaken; California law allows rescission for
unilateral mistake; section 1577 of the Civil Code, however,
limits relief to those mistakes not caused by a neglect of a
legal duty. The sellers, having expressed dissatisfaction with
the release clause (the focal point of the "mistake") before
close of escrow but then failing to raise their objection at
escrow, being thus on inquiry as to the meaning of the word
"contiguous," neglected their legal duty. Besides, rescission
for unilateral mistake will not be allowed where it would impose substantial hardship on the other party. Since the writer
has expressed the opinion that this exposition is unnecessary
to the correct result, no further comment will be made except
to express the hope that resolution of problems of "misunder74
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standings" or lack of communication or uncertainty will not
enter into the "mistake" area, which is boggy enough.
From Gibbons v. Travelers Ins. Co./ 7 we learn that "extrinsic mistake," when applied to a court judgment, means
something different from "extrinsic mistake" in making a contract in California. Here a personal injury settlement was
effected on the basis of a skull fracture, with apparent complete recovery. Later a permanent impairment of hearing
developed. Such personal injury settlements and releases are
often the subject of litigation aimed at rescinding them because of a mistake of fact (different injury) going to the basis
on which the settlement was made, that is, mistake as to an
"extrinsic fact."
Such a contention was advanced in Gibbons and for present
purposes may be assumed to have had merit. However, in
Gibbons the injured party was a minor and the settlement
had court approval. Of course a mistake in a court judgment
can also be set aside for an "extrinsic mistake," but such a
mistake is one "which prevents the litigant from knowing he
has a day in court . . . [it] is not concerned with the nature or quality of the presentation which the litigant can make,
so long as he is given an opportunity to make it." Moral:
litigants make basic extrinsic mistakes; judges don't.
XII. Remedies for Breach of Land Sale Contract
A. Buyer in Default-Damages-General Principles
Remedial problems concerning executory land sale contracts in California are somewhat acute, considering our
antideficiency statutes, and our distinctions between routine
transactions through escrow and instalment contracts with
retained title as security. In addition, there is a generalized
antipathy toward enrichment even at the expense of wilful
contract defaulters.
Prior case law has established the right of the wilfully de17. 274 Cal. App.2d -,79 Cal. Rptr.
438 (1969).
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faulting buyer to restitution in an affirmative action,I8 and
has defined enrichment as the excess of the price advanced
over damages l9 as measured by the rule in Royer v. Carter. 20
Applying these principles, the defaulting purchasers of a
snack shop were denied restitution in Sweet v. ReUsl because
there was no net enrichment. The "benefit of the bargain"
damages alone exceeded the payments made.
In Barton v. White Oak Realty, Inc.,2 the defaulting buyer
sued to recover her deposit, the sellers cross complaining for
damages. The purchase price was $199,500 and the broker's
commission totaled $11,970. Benefit-of-bargain damages
were $4,500. 3 The trial court allowed the cross-complainants
these damages plus the broker's commissions; thus, the simple
question posed on appeal was whether benefit-of-bargain damages plus the broker's commission on the original sale can be
recovered by the sellers. After a careful analysis, the reviewing Court held this not necessarily so. If the seller recovers his expectancy damages plus the expenses, including
commissions, that he would have had to pay on the sale if
consummated, he is prima facie placed in a better position
by the buyer's default. Therefore, the Court points out, the
Royer rule states that the additional expenses allowed the
seller (in addition to the general expectancy damages) are
those in connection with a hypothetical resale at market value
at the time of breach. If the contract price and market value
are the same (i.e., no recoverable expectancy damages), the
expenses of the hypothetical resale would normally be the
same as actually incurred in conjunction with the broken
18. Freedman v. The Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish,
et al. 37 Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d 629,
31 A.L.R.2d 1 (1951).
19. Honey v. Henry's Franchise
Leasing Corp. of America, 64 Cal.2d
801, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18, 415 P.2d 833
(1966).
20. 37 Cal.2d 544, 233 P.2d 539
(1951).
1. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
829 (1969).
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2. 271 Cal. App.2d 579, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 587 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see Bernhardt, REAL
PROPERTY, in this volume.
3. The sellers claimed $39,500 as
the difference between the contract
price and the market value at the time
of breach. Justice Kaus, exercising his
characteristic gift for the apt phrase,
remarked, "the court found that the
owners had not overreached themselves
as much as they had thought."
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contract. But if the actual market value is lower, presumably
the recoverable expenses in connection with the hypothetical
resale, particularly with respect to commissions, would also
be lower. (And, of course, a prompt actual resale at actual
market price might disclose additional recoverable expenses.)
However, a buyer is to be credited with any savings of actual
expense in connection with the broken contract. In Royer the
seller saved $780 in commission expense that he would have
had to pay if the sale had gone through.
Applying these propositions to the present case, the buyer
is liable (in addition to benefit-of-bargain damages) for expenses, including commissions, on a hypothetical resale, offset
by any savings in commissions by reason of the failure of the
first sale to go through. Thus, the issue becomes not whether
the seller gets the broker's commission for the first sale, but
whether he can avoid their offset because he may not be liable
for them. In this connection the seller argued that by bringing an action for damages, liability is automatically incurred
for the broker's commission on the broken contract; that if
the seller recovers the benefit of the bargain, the broker should
be paid. The court rejected this proposition by pointing out
that this would be in direct conflict with Royer,4 where the
seller also sued, but the court offset the $780 commission
actually saved. To accept the seller's proposition would make
that $780 saving illusory. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further findings as to (1) the expenses of a second
hypothetical sale and (2) whether the brokers had actually
earned the commission at the time of breach (in contrast to
the assumption that the mere filing of this action entitled
them to the commission, as urged above). In case the reader
is wondering why there was such concern as to whether the
broker earned the commission and whether the seller could
recover it, it should be pointed out that the seller was also
one of the brokers.
4. The court also declined to be
bound by any intimations to the contrary in Lesser v. W. B. McGerry &
CAL LAW 1970
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Again, Sutter v. Madrin,5 the defaulting buyer sued
for restitution of deposits in escrow ($20,000), and again
the question of offsets for damages incurred by the seller under
Royer was presented, here, however, with certain amplifying
interpretations of Royer in mind. These interpretations are
contained in a 1964 case, Allen v. Enomoto,6 where the seller
traded the property within the shortest possible time after
the buyer's breach. There were no benefit-of-bargain damages,
but the court quoted the qualifying language from Royer:
"[A]dditional expenses [which] are the natural consequences
. may be recovered." In the circumof the breach.
stances of Allen, these were held to include fire insurance,
mortgage interest, and property taxes during the interim
period between breach and resale (a trade in this case), as
well as certain costs connected with the resale (trade) such
as refinancing the loan and obtaining title insurance on the
property received in trade.
In Sutter, there were no benefit-of-bargain damages, and,
more importantly, there had been no resale. The trial court
found "additional expenses" of operating and maintaining the
property in excess of the buyer's deposit in escrow. The
state of the record, with conflicting and vague findings and
conclusions, was deemed such that a remand was necessary in
any case. The concurring opinion should be read first, as
it offers a novel observation about benefit-of-bargain damages as well as specific guides to the interpretation of Royer.
First of all, according to the concurring opinion, it is wrong
to conclude that a finding of fact that the market value of
the property did not change during the period of escrow imparts no damage. A two-month delay in the right to receive
the purchase price damages the vendor, and interest on the
purchase price at the legal rate during this period of delay
should be allowed as damage. The second element of damages
is the seller's actual expenses incurred in performance-in this
case broker commissions and legal fees incurred in connection
with the abortive sale. (Note that this approach vanes
5. 269 Cal. App.2d 161, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 627 (1969).
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6. 228 Cal. App.2d 798, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 815 (1964).
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from the calculation of expenses of a hypothetical second
sale as analyzed in Barton v. White Oak Realty, supra.) Expenses of operating and maintaining the property are not
allowable, since they are offset by the value of its possession.
The majority opinion was less concerned with the specifics
than with the problems suggested by an application of the
Allen language to the situation in the case at bar. Without
adequate findings, a resolution of the issues presented was
impossible, so judgment was reversed. Because the opinion
states, better than any summary could, the doubts and uncertainties about the 1969 state of the law of damages in
favor of a seller upon a buyer's breach of a land sale contract,
the following extensive quote is made for such illumination
as the practicing lawyer may gain therefrom:
To permit items of fire insurance, taxes, mortgage interest and numerous other expenses implicit in the ownership and possession of the property as such 'additional
expenses' opens the door to many difficult questions.
Does a seller have the right to hold indefinitely and sue
for loss incurred on expenses as enumerated in Allen, as
such expenses are incurred or paid or may such expenses
be permitted to accumulate? For example, if the owner
never resold and held the property at a loss, does a cause
of action accrue at his election within the statute of limitations and does he have more than one such action?
Must the owner, in order to collect such items of damage, sell within a reasonable period after the breach?
To what extent, then, could the defau1ting vendee offset
the value of the use of the subject property? What
would be the effect of an interim increase or decrease
in value over the market value on the date of the breach?
Is a seller entitled to interest on the agreed purchase
price, as suggested in the concurring opinion, for the
period of an aborted escrow? Doesn't every seller implicitly waive interest on every purchase price for the
duration of every escrow unless explicitly otherwise proCAL LAW 1970
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vided? Does a defaulting vendee assume all the expenses
and obligations of unprofitable ownership?7

B. Damages v. Rescission v. Foreclosure of Vendor's
Lien v. Suit To Quiet Title
1. In General. All the cases in the foregoing subsection
except ones were land sale transactions through the
normal escrow process. Gantner v. Johnson,9 on the
other hand, involved an instalment land sale contract,
with title retained by the vendor. This, of course, is
recognized in California as a form of security transaction subject to the anti deficiency statutes. Iil For
purposes of discussion, only certain rounded-off dollar
figures will be utilized, and the community property
aspects of the case, along with some consequential
damages and repair costs, will be ignored. Assume a
contract price of $68,500. The buyer, over the course
of years, has made payments on principal of $42,500,
leaving a balance of $26,000. The property is now
worth $38,000. The buyer defaults; the seller re-enters. What are seller's remedies if he wants the property?l1
2. Foreclosure of Vendor's Lien. The seller may bid in
the property at the current market if he desires to go
through this procedure.
3. Rescission. This obviously holds little appeal in a
falling market, as it means here a restoration of the
$42,500 received, less any consequential damage.
4. Suit for Damages. A straightforward action for benefit-of-bargain damages, with the usual contract rule
7. 269 Cal. App.2d 161 at p. 170,
74 Cal. Rptr. 627 at p. 633 (1969).
8. Honey v. Henry's Franchise
Leasing Corp., 64 Cal.2d SOl, 52 Cal.
Rptr. IS, 415 P.2d S33 (1966).
9. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 3S1 (1969).

10. See Code of Civ. Proc.
80
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11. Parenthetically, if the vendor
wishes to be rid of the property, the
attempted remedy of an action for the
purchase price or for specific performance might well encounter the rule in
Venable v. Harmon, 233 Cal. App.2d
297, 43 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1965), that the
antideficiency statute would operate as
a bar.
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limiting recovery of specials to those within the contemplation of the parties, poses an anomaly. The
vendor assumes the burden of proving damages. To
the extent, as here, that the proof falls short of the
sum received, he is merely establishing a credit that
must be refunded. Should he perchance succeed in
establishing benefit-of-bargain damages in excess of
payments received, a judgment for such excess would
apparently be contrary to the California antideficiency
statutes. Of course the statement of facts excludes
this as a practical, if not hypothetical, possibility.
5. Do Nothing. In view of the foregoing, the temptation to avoid action has a measure of attraction, although the hiatus may be an uneasy one. Suppose the
buyer serves a written offer for a mutual rescission.
Acceptance is unthinkable; a rejection, on the other
hand, may be regretted if there is a sudden rise in land
values, in which event the buyer may be encouraged
to incur the imposition of damages as a condition of
resuming performance. An opportune resale is inhibited by the outstanding contract, broken though
it may be. At best, the vendor may expect some
assertion of a restitutionary claim, but the situation
is not exactly under his control.
6. Suit to Quiet Title. This was the remedy chosen by
the vendor in Gantner and will probably become the
common remedy in California. The filing of such a
suit naturally prompts the buyer to cross complain,
alleging that a forfeiture of interests in the property
would result in unjust enrichment. This puts the
defendant in the posture of a wilfully defaulting vendee seeking restitution. Applying the Honey rule,
benefit-of-bargain damages (per Royer) are subtracted from the sum paid on the purchase price, and the
balance returned by way of restitution. This approach
has the advantage of clearing title as well as resolving
the ultimate restitution problem on conditions of convenience to the seller. Although this appears to be
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but a disguised action for damages, there are doctrinal aspects which favor it. The vendor seeks to
impose no personal judgment and therefore has no
burden of proving damages (including any by-play
as to what was in the contemplation of the parties);
on the contrary, the burden is on the wilful defaulter
to prove that the seller has sustained a net enrichment. Proper restitution principles, in the case of a
wilful defaulter, would not limit the detriment sustained by the innocent party to rigid contract dam-·
ages, but would include other injury proximately sustained, whether foreseeable or not. (Maybe this is
what Allen v. Enomoto, (supra) was trying to say.)
Speaking of doctrinal aspects, an anomaly exists in the
use of a quiet title suit in the situation under discussion. In
theory, such a suit by the vendor seeks to cut off the buyer's
equity. It is contract-terminating, and, as such, close to
rescission. Should it actually be called that, it would be fatal
to the seller's case. The decision in Gantner (following
Honey) meets the problem head on: "A vendor does not elect
to rescind by bringing a quiet title action or by going into
possession of the property after default by the vendee." So
be it, the vendor has not elected to terminate the contract. He
certainly hasn't elected to affirm it either. What has he done?

c.

Contract for the Sale of an Interest in Land-Seller
in Default-Specific Performance v. Damages

Brandolino v. Lindsai2 presents one of the classic dilemmas
of the law-equity dichotomy. Implicit in the application of
the benefit-of-bargain rule of damages at law is a statement
that one party quite discernibly got the worst of the deal.
The standard equity rule has been that hardship or inadequacy
of consideration (absent fraud, mistake, undue influence, etc.)
constitute defenses to the equitable remedy of specific performance but are not grounds for rescission of the contract; it is
12. 269 Cal. App.2d 319, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 56 (1969).
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thus permissible to dismiss the specific performance action,
and with a residue of good conscience, leave the plaintiff to
pursue his legal remedy. The procedural merger of law and
equity sharpens the dichotomy, since a court sitting as chancellor may be called upon to deny specific performance as
inequitable, only to be requested, as judge, to order payment
of damages. In California, the equitable rule is strengthened
by statute,13 rendering specific performance unenforceable
against a party where consideration is not adequate or the
contract is not, as to him, just and reasonable. Plaintiff must
allege that the contract is fair and reasonable. (It may also
be noted that in California the buyer must establish that the
vendor's breach was in bad faith to get benefit-of-bargain damages.)
In Baran v. Goldberg,14 specific performance was denied the
buyers because the market value of $16,500 was markedly
greater than the contract price of $11,000. In-lieu damages
were refused because the complaint, seeking only specific
performance, stated no facts (naturally) to sustain an award
of damages. Other cases, relying on Baran, have summarily
stated that if specific performance is denied because of inadequacy of consideration, damages cannot be awarded. A
reasonable inference may be drawn from this that would lead
a lawyer to counsel a vendee client (understandably elated
about a "fantastic" deal) to be content with a damage action,
rather than to hazard drafting a complaint for specific performance, no matter how badly the client wanted the property.
In close cases, with uncertain market values, it is probable
that many California lawyers have been troubled about their
advice to clients.
Counsel for the vendees in Brandolino did not hesitate.
According to the statement of facts, a land sale contract for
$50,000 was signed. Three days later the seller canceled the
escrow, saying he could "get twice as much." Plaintiffs then
filed suit and recorded a notice of lis pendens. Two causes
of action were stated in the verified complaint:
13. Civ. Code § 3391(1), (I).

14. 86 Cal. App.2d 506, 194 P.2d
765 (1948).
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1) specific performance, alleging the agreed price of
$50,000 and that this amount was the "fair and reasonable"
value of the property.
2) damages for breach "in the amount of $25,000 which is
the difference between the agreed price, $50,000, of the property, and the value, $75,000." (An allegation that the breach
was in bad faith must be assumed.)
The parties proceeded to trial. When the vendee's own
witness testified that the property was worth over $80,000, the
judge stated that specific performance would be denied. Plaintiff's counsel thereupon announced abandonment of that cause
of action. Damages in the amount of $25,000 were then
awarded. The seller's reaction to this award of damages,
"in equity" as he called it, was predictably sharp.
To permit them to falsify their own allegations to seek
damages under the circumstances makes a mockery of
equity' and that 'the greater the discrepancy in the sworn
allegation as to value, the greater would be their reward
of damages.' He asserts further that charging him with
bad faith and loading him with heavy damages for refusing to perform the unfair agreement while he was prevented by the lis pendens notice from salvaging anything
from the property rendered meaningless the equitable rule
against enforcing performance of an unjust agreement. 15
The appellate Court, nonetheless, affirmed the judgment for
damages, holding merely that a plaintiff in California is allowed to pursue alternative remedies and plead inconsistent
causes of action and also that the decision as to an election
need not be forced until after the evidence is taken. While
filing a lis pendens in conjunction with specific performance
is proper, in a pure damage action it might be considered
abuse of process. However, the Court went on to hold that
the recording of the lis pendens does not here "preclude plaintiffs from recovering damages in the event specific performance
could not be decreed." If any criticism of Brandolino is in
15. 269 Cal. App.2d at 324, 75 Cal.
Rptr. at 59 (1969).
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order it is not that the plaintiff has pleaded inconsistent causes
of action or remedies but that he may have come dangerously
close to pleading "contradictory or antagonistic facts,"16 which
is another matter. In any event, the decision, as long as it
holds, allows more room for maneuver with regard to the
vendee's remedial possibilities than has formerly been thought
to be the case.

XIII. Remedies for Breach of Contract
A. Construction Contracts-Breach by Owner-Damages
According to Stephan v. Maioof,17 the measure of damages
for breach, by the owner, of a construction contract, is the
lost profits even thought the contractor never began performance. The defendant in Stephan urged reduction of damages
(1) by the amount of the value of the contractor's own
services which it was claimed was part of cost of performance;
and (2) by an amount equivalent to plaintiff's release from
care, trouble, risk, and responsibility which would have attended full performance. The appellate Court rejected the
argument, properly noting that this application of the doctrine
of avoidable consequences, while perhaps applicable to a
breach of contract for personal services (where the employer
has the exclusive right to plaintiff's work), is inapplicable to
the present case.
B. Employment Contracts-Breach by Employee-Specific Performance and Damages
California Labor Code, section 2855, allowing enforcement
of unique services contracts for a term not exceeding "seven
years from the commencement of service under it," does not
enlarge the remedial rights of an employer beyond the actual
termination date of employment. Rick Barry was employed
16. See, e.g., Beatty v. Pacific States
Savings & Loan Co., 4 Cal. App.2d
692, 695, 41 P.2d 378, 380 (1935).
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by the San Francisco Warriors under a one-year professional
basketball contract with a unilateral option for another year
if the player failed to sign a renewal contract. At the end
of the term, Barry failed to renew his contract with the Warriors and signed with a rival team, the Oakland Oaks. He was
enjoined from playing for the Oaks for the year during which
the reserve clause operated in the Warriors' favor. He did not
play out the option with the Warriors but sat out the season
pursuant to the injunction. In Lemat Corp. v. Barry/8 the
Warriors contended that under the Labor Code, an injunction
for up to seven years should be granted. The trial court blew
the whistle on this attempted double dribble. Although it
found that the Warriors lost $356,000 in gate receipts by
reason of Barry's absence (it would have been even greater
had Barry actually played for the cross-bay rivals), it declined
to award damages, while at the same time limiting the final
injunction to the contract term.
The appellate Court agreed as to the injunction. The Labor
Code section was held to embody a limitation upon enforcing
these contracts of adhesion, rather than permitting enforcement beyond the termination of the contract period. On the
issue of damages, the appellate opinion said that a detailed
discussion was not required, because it was clear that the
request for relief was in the alternative and that damages
would be of significance only if the equitable relief (as limited)
had been denied. Having disposed of the issue in the case at
bar, the opinion proceeded to include some questionable dicta.
Describing plaintiff's contention as "unique," the court, citing
California cases, recited a general rule limiting a plaintiff to
an injunction against future injuries and damages for past
mJunes. Such a rule, however, overlooks the dual aspects
of these Lumley-Wagner type cases. Whereas an injunction
ordinarily precludes future damage, this is not so in the case
here presented. Barry was enjoined (the negative aspect)
from playing for Oakland for the final year of the contract.
But the equity decree did not accomplish the affirmative aspect
18. 275 Cal. App.2d -,80 Cal. Rptr.
240 (1969).
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of performance; Barry did not play for the Warriors. Such
damage is not prevented by an injunction. The so-called general rule does not apply. On the contrary, the more relevant
maxim that equity will not do justice by halves, or the principle
that equity having taken jurisdiction will proceed to give full
relief, should be invoked to sanction both an injunction and
damages.
Commenting that "damages" in a situation of this kind
are speculative and uncertain and practically impossible to
ascertain, the appellate Court questioned, in passing, the evidentiary and logical basis for the trial court's finding that
the Warriors had incurred a gate loss of $356,000 by reason
of Barry's absence. This argument is fast losing persuasiveness in the modern era of professional athletics and electronic
entertainment. Speculation as to amount remains, but the fact
of damage is apparent to everyone. Enormously remunerative
contracts are negoti';lted in hard-nosed business sessions between lawyers and agents, the gate-draw potential of a high
draft choice being a dominant factor. Patronizing solicitude
for the businessman-athlete seems curiously out of place.
Conceding the necessity of some "speculation," it seems that
modern courts are lagging behind the times in failing to deal
adequately and realistically with prime business considerations
in what are, with increasing frequency, million-dollar transactions.
XIV. Contracts Normally Unenforceable by Reason of the
Statute of Frauds or the Statute of Wills
California courts continue a liberal use of the "estoppel"
principle in negating the statutory requirements of a writing
both as to contracts and wills, and in fashioning suitable remedial devices to enforce oral agreements. In Di Salvo v. Bank
of America/ 9 the reviewing Court reversed a judgment of dismissal and held that a constructive trust might properly be
claimed as to one-half of the Smith estate, then in probate.
19. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr.
838 (1969).
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According to the allegations, the women had trouble with the
menfolk in decedent's family. The plaintiff here is Granddaughter Smith. Some years prior to the action Grandfather
Smith had been living with another woman. A family arrangement was made, represented by the oral agreement in
question, whereby Grandmother Smith agreed to allow Grandfather to dispose of the community property by will. Grandfather agreed to see that his wife and granddaughter were
taken care of. Father Smith was to receive the community
property and he in turn agreed to care for his mother for life
and leave one-half of whatever property he had at death
to the plaintiff. Father Smith, however willed the property
to his third wife, with only a contingent interest to the plaintiff. In holding that these allegations stated a cause of action
sufficient to impose a constructive trust in plaintiff's favor,
based on estoppel against the estate to assert the statute of
frauds, the Court took particular care to caution the lower
court on retrial to accept only clear and convincing evidence.
Of interest here is that the grandmother, who, as promisee,
gave up her community interests, is not a party to the suit;
the estoppel runs in favor of the donee beneficiary, who gave
up nothing.
It is fairly obvious that the more expansive rationale of
"estoppel to assert the statute of frauds" has largely supplanted the "part performance" doctrine to bring about the
enforcement of oral land sale contracts in California. Without the restrictive requirement of the part performance doctrine-that buyer's change of position be unequivocally related
to the contract or in pursuance of the contractual objectives
-the estoppel approach offers much broader evidentiary possibilities of detrimental reliance or unjust enrichment, the
prevention of which, of course, underlies both theories. In
Carlson v. Richardson,20 buyer sued for specific performance
of an oral contract for the sale of an acre of ocean-front property. Unless the contract were enforced, he alleged, the
seller would be unjustly enriched because the land had risen
20. 267 Cal. App.2d 204, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (1968). For further discus-
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in value since the contract, and, in addition, he [the buyer]
would suffer detriment from the loss of the bargain and from
"lost opportunities" to purchase the land. Buyer also averred
detrimental reliance based upon his purchase of adjacent
property for use as a temporary residence while he built on
the property in dispute. None of these averments, it will be
observed, would support a part performance theory. The tria]
court sustained a demurrer, which was reversed on appeal.
The reviewing Court held that while the assertion of "lost opportunities" cannot support a claim of reliance in detriment,
nor can the fact of rising land values sustain a claim of unjust
enrichment, the allegation of purchase of the neighboring
property for temporary residence states a cause of action.
Since the decision merely overrules a demurrer, too much
should not be made of it. However, the cases in which "estoppel" has been invoked have in the main been those where
the plaintiff has given up lucrative work and moved. Such
forms of detrimental reliance are hard to remedy without
enforcing the contract. Here the facts pleaded disclosed the
detriment to be a failure to purchase property in an area of
rising land values-not inevitably an irreversible detriment.
Perhaps the message from this liberal handling of estoppel
in California is that out West we consider that a man's word
ought to be as good as his bond.

xv.

Illegal Contracts-Equitable Remedies

Although courts nominally will afford no remedy, either
by way of enforcement or restitution, to partieS to an illegal
transaction (absent certain well-established exceptions), California courts in recent years have avoided summary disposition
of these cases in favor of equitable adjustment which avoid
outrageous unjust enrichment and without, as a practical
matter, condoning or encouraging illegal bargains.
In Griffis v. Squire,l the plaintiff, an entryman on 320 acres
under the Desert Land Entries Act (43 U.S.c. § 32), con1. 267 Cal. App.2d 461, 73 Cal. Rptr.
154 (1968).
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tracted with defendants to convey 178.46 of the acres in consideration of development work that would enable plaintiff
to complete the entry requirements. Such executory contracts
prior to execution of the patent are illegal, and the illegality
is not to be regarded as trivial. Defendants, however, had
labored mightily and spent $90,000, and the work necessary
for plaintiff's patent, and more, had been completed. Having
obtained the patent, plaintiff sued to quiet title and defendant
sought specific performance of the contract. The illegality
was not called to the trial court's attention and it found for
defendant. The reviewing Court reversed. While declining
to grant specific performance of the illegal bargain (thereby
depriving the defendant of the enhanced value of the land),
it remanded for retrial on the issue of whether an equitable
lien should be imposed against the land for the moneys expended in making the improvements (thereby precluding a
large measure of unjust enrichment) plus taxes and insurance
paid by the defendants.2
2. This equitable result was based
squarely on the case of Hainey v.
Narigon 247 Cal. App.2d 528, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 638 (1966), which was favorably
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